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If in some smothering dreams you too could pace 
Behind the wagon that we flung him in, 
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face, 
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin; 
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood 
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, 
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud 
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues, 
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest 
To children ardent for some desperate glory, 
The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est 
Pro patria mori.1 
—Wilfred Owen 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 21, 2013, a rocket attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus killed 
numerous civilians and left many others wounded and complaining of a range of 
symptoms, from shortness of breath to general disorientation.2 UN investigators 
later confirmed that the shells from the attack contained the nerve agent sarin, 
delivered in artillery rockets against a target area that included civilians.3 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon denounced the attack as a “war crime,” 
and the international community mobilized to take action4—despite the fact that 
Syria is not a party to either the Chemical Weapons Convention5or the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention6—because customary international law drawn 
from the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 
 
1. Wilfred Owen, Dulce et Decorum Est (1917), available at http://www.warpoetry.co.uk/owen1.html. 
Owen’s poem describes the horror of a gas attack as the troops in the trenches would have experienced it. He 
died in battle seven days before the Armistice that ended World War I. Wilfred Owen, Greatest of the War 
Poets Who Have Written in the English Language, THE WAR POETRY WEBSITE, http://www.warpoetry.co.uk/ 
owena.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 




5. See Joshua Meir Freedman, Don’t Let Assad Sign the Chemical Weapons Convention on Syria’s 
Behalf: Allowing Bashar al-Assad to Sign an International Treaty on Behalf of Syria, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 29, 
2013), https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/dont-let-assad-sign-chemical-weapons-convention-syrias-1447184 
06.html. 
6. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
Disarmament Agreements and Commitment, 17 (July 2014). 
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(hereinafter “Geneva Protocol,” or “the Protocol”) forbids the use of chemical 
weapons.7 
In 1925, the major global powers drafted the Geneva Protocol, a document 
that, by 1970, had eighty-four nations that were parties to the treaty.8 The Geneva 
Protocol forbade “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and 
of all analogous liquids, materials or devices,” a description that can be read to 
cover nerve agents like sarin.9 
Just around two and a half months after the chemical attacks in Syria, the 
United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on a case that, on its surface, 
bears no resemblance to the horrors of chemical warfare the civilians of 
Damascus experienced.10 Carol Anne Bond, upon learning that her friend was 
pregnant with her husband’s child, stole toxic chemicals from her workplace and 
applied them to her friend’s doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox.11 Bond’s 
friend, Myrlinda Haynes, suffered minor burns from the chemicals.12 What would 
appear to be a simple case of poisoning in fact transformed into a national debate 
about the power of the Federal government to enact legislation that implements 
treaties.13 Rather than charge Bond under state law, where the penalty would 
range from three months to two years in prison, prosecutors charged Bond under 
18 U.S.C.A. section 229, the statute implementing the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereinafter “Chemical Weapons 
Convention” or “CWC”), which carries much higher penalties.14 Sentenced to six 
years in prison, Bond challenged the constitutionality of the statute, while the 
Obama administration cautioned that any move by the Supreme Court to limit the 
applicability of the statute enforcing the treaty at home could cause difficulties in 
enforcement abroad.15 In part this is because prosecutors charged Bond under the 
 
7. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Jun. 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (hereinafter “Geneva 
Protocol”); R. R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 853 (1970). 
8. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 854. 
9. Geneva Protocol, supra, note 7. 
10. Bond v. United States, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_12_158#bluebook (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). The case was 




14. Warren Richey, Is a Thumb Burn a Chemical Weapons Violation? Supreme Court Takes up Case, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/1104/Is-
thumb-burn-a-chemical-weapons-violation-Supreme-Court-takes-up-case; 18 U.S.C.A. § 229 (1998). 
15. Id.; The Supreme Court ruled in her favor, finding that it was unreasonable to interpret the phrase 
“chemical weapon” to cover Bond’s actions, despite noting that the definition in the statute is broad enough to 
encompass Bond’s actions. Bond v. United States, 134 S. CT. 2077 (2014). For an in-depth discussion of the 
Bond case, see infra Part IV.B. 
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statute implementing the same treaty that Syria agreed to sign after pressure from 
the international community.16 
Clearly, the effects of a sarin gas attack and the minor burns that result from 
touching corrosive chemicals left by a jealous rival are hardly on the same scale, 
yet both implicated the Chemical Weapons Convention, a 1993 treaty that set out 
to further codify the international prohibition on chemical weapons first set forth 
in the Geneva Protocol.17 How is it possible to bring two such disparate examples 
of chemical use under the same treaty? 
The answer may lie in the phrasing of the treaty itself, which defines 
chemical weapons as “Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where 
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types 
and quantities are consistent with such purposes.”18 The breadth of chemicals 
covered under such a definition therefore can be read to include both sarin gas 
and the toxic chemicals Bond used against her rival.19 
The over-broad description of banned chemical weapons—first found in the 
Geneva Protocol and carried over into subsequent treaties—coupled with the lack 
of specific enforcement mechanisms,20 creates a situation where compliance is 
dependent on general fear and international disapproval of the idea of chemical 
weapons. Under-application of prohibitions on chemical weapons has the 
potential to make the treaties meaningless, while over-application removes the 
uncommon character of chemical weapons and the fear that prevents their use.21 
This Comment will begin by looking at the history of chemical weapons in 
the modern era and the various prohibitions against them. This will provide a 
description of the pattern of behavior that informs modern opinions on chemical 
weapons and illustrate the origins of these fears.22 Part II will begin with a look at 
the fin de siècle prohibitions that influenced World War I, and will then look at 
the War and its impact on subsequent international agreements.23 Part III will 
look at subsequent tests of Geneva and the development of additional agreements 
 
16. Richey, supra note 14. 
17. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, with Annexes, 
Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (hereinafter “CWC”). 
18. Id. 
19. Richey, supra note 14; See also Bond,134 S.Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
20. Geneva Protocol, supra, note 7; CWC, supra note 17, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. II, XII. It should be 
noted that the CWC does provide a schedule for destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, and a 
monitoring and enforcement body to do on-site inspections and investigations, but as three states have achieved 
complete destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and the United States has missed both its deadlines and 
now projects a completion date of 2023, it is hard to argue that these mechanisms are overly effective. James 
Lewis, Fact Sheet: Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-
PROLIFERATION (Feb. 4. 2014) http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/biochem/fact_sheet_cw/. 
21. See infra Part III .B, for a discussion of under-enforcement; See infra Part IV.A, for a discussion of 
the consequences in Syria, and infra Part IV.B, for a discussion of over-enforcement. 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part II. 
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to expand upon the prohibitions, as well as looking at the more notable breaches 
of the agreements in the second half of the 20th century.24 Part IV will look at the 
application of chemical weapons treaties in the contemporary setting, and will 
investigate what binds nations to these agreements by looking at the attacks in 
Syria and the Bond case to determine what enforcement mechanisms are in place 
and how adequate these mechanisms are in the modern world.25 The history of 
chemical weapons treaties—and how they were understood by the societies that 
adopted them—informs the context of treaty provisions issues the Bond case and 
Syria both raise. Part V will suggest a means of strengthening chemical weapons 
treaties by creating better enforcement mechanisms and more specific definitions 
of what constitutes a chemical weapon.26 
II. THE FIRST WORLD WAR & THE GENEVA PROTOCOL 
A. The Origins of Chemical Warfare in the Modern Era: The Push for 
Development and the Call for Restrictions 
On April 22, 1915, German troops at the Ypres salient27 launched what was 
to that date the largest use of chemical gas against enemy combatants in warfare, 
releasing chlorine gas against French and British troops and provoking moral 
outrage and indignation from Allied leaders.28 While Ypres is the best-known use 
of asphyxiating gas, and the one that drew the most attention, the French had 
been using milder chemical gas irritants against German troops as early as 1914 
in efforts to break through the enemy line.29 These early attempts were largely 
unsuccessful in doing more than temporarily impairing the soldiers caught in the 
attacks, but the French use of gas may have encouraged German research into a 
more effective chemical weapons program that led to the chlorine attack at 
Ypres.30 
While popular belief fixes the beginnings of chemical warfare at Ypres, in 
fact it has a much longer history in modern times, reaching all the way back to 
 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See infra Part V. 
27. A salient is a bulge in the line surrounded by the enemy on three sides. The Ypres salient was one of 
the best-known of the war. The Great War 1914-1918, The Ypres Salient Battlefields, Belgium, http://www. 
greatwar.co.uk/ypres-salient/ (last visited Sep. 20, 2014). 
28. Ulrich Trumpener, The Road to Ypres: The Beginnings of Gas Warfare in World War I, 47 J. MOD. 
HIST. 460, 460–61 (1975). An estimated 150 tons of compressed chlorine was released into the wind, spreading 
to cover a 4 mile wide area. Despite the scale of the attack, German troops did not actually achieve any decisive 
strategic victory, and the Ypres salient remained. Id. 
29. Id. at 461–63. 
30. Id. at 463. 
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theoretical discussions of its use during the Napoleonic Wars.31 The discussion 
arose again in 1846, where a government committee in Britain voted against the 
use of sulfur dioxide launched from ships.32 In addition to being concerned about 
breaching the rules of “civilized” warfare, the committee was concerned with 
other nations learning the secret of the new weapon once the British deployed it 
in war.33 Given that proliferation is one of the biggest concerns about the use of 
chemical weapons today, this rationale for discouraging their use suggests a 
parallel with modern times and indicates that the “othering”34 of chemical 
weapons extends much further into the past than the First World War.35 
Despite the urgings of two separate advocates for their use, the British again 
declined to deploy poison gases against the Russians during the Crimean War.36 
Across the Atlantic, at least two Northerners wrote letters to military authorities 
suggesting possible designs for chemical weapons shells to use the American 
Civil War, and there is anecdotal evidence that, late in the war, glass grenades 
filled with gas-producing chemicals may have been developed, though whether 
or not they existed or were merely conceptualized is unclear.37 
Although there is no evidence of chemical weapons use in any major 
Western conflict by the close of the 19th century, there was enough concern about 
the possibility of their use that delegates to the first Hague Conference in 1899 
felt the need to include a provision in the Hague Peace Conference known as 
Hague Declaration IV, banning the use of “projectiles the sole object of which is 
 
31. Wyndham D. Miles, The Idea of Chemical Warfare in Modern Times, 31 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 297, 297 
(1970). Miles claims that as early as 1811, British Naval Officer Thomas Cochrane began working on a plan to 
use gas from burning sulfur to attack French fortifications. Id. 
32. Id. at 298. 
33. Id. 
34. The term “othering” is used in anthropology to describe the process by which one group points out the 
perceived weaknesses of one group in order to make one’s own group seem more powerful in comparison. Sara 
Rismyhr Engelund, Introductory Essay: “The Other” and “Othering,” NEW NARRATIVES, http://newnarratives. 
wordpress.com/issue-2-the-other/other-and-othering-2/ (last visited May 26, 2014). Here, I use the term to describe 
the way in which society has come to view chemical weapons as fundamentally different from other means of 
killing and the creation of the idea that chemical weapons are inherently cruel, while other means of causing death 
are seen as less so. 
35. See, e.g., J. P. Perry Robinson, Disarmament and Other Options for Western Policy-Making on 
Chemical Warfare, 63 INT’L AFFAIRS 65 (1986). (discussing chemical weapons in the context of Cold War 
deterrence and concerns that Soviet chemical weapons advancements may outstrip American programs.) 
36. Miles, supra note 31, at 298-99. Thomas Cochrane again pushed for the use of sulfur against Russian 
forces at Sevastopol, while Lyon Playfair advocated the use of brittle metal shells filled with acodyls cyanide 
against Russian ships. Both ideas were rejected by the War Department. Once again, proponents sought to 
combine naval engagements and chemical gas. This historic connection to naval warfare may suggest why the 
first agreement about chemical weapons following World War I was the Washington Treaty relating to the Use 
of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare; Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in 
Warfare, Washington, Feb. 6, 1922, 25 L.N.T.S. 202 (hereinafter “Washington Naval Treaty”). 
37. Miles, supra note 31, at 300–03. Miles cites a number of letters and articles written during the Civil 
War that reference chemical weapons in detail, but they contain mostly theoretical discussions, and he is unable 
to present any direct evidence that any of these weapons actually went into production or were ever tested. Id. 
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the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”38 The wording of this 
Declaration, while seemingly straight-forward, suggests some leeway regarding 
the types of weapons it covers, which is also characteristic of later, post-war 
agreements.39 The Declaration bans projectiles, but says nothing about other 
methods of delivery.40 As the attack at Ypres consisted of cylinders of 
compressed chlorine gas released into the wind by nozzles, this was technically 
not a violation of the specific language of the Declaration, though it clearly went 
against the Declaration’s intent.41 Germany, France, and Britain were all 
signatories of Hague Declaration IV and, by the end of the war, all had deployed 
chemical weapons against enemy troops.42 
Indeed, it seems that German High Command, in planning how to deploy 
chemical weapons, did carefully consider the wording of the Hague Peace 
Conference as a whole, along with the specifics of Hague Declaration IV.43 
Despite the Conference banning poisoned weapons, German officials determined 
that, since “asphyxiating gases” were covered under an agreement separate from 
the agreement on poisoned weapons, they did not fall under the stricter ban of the 
latter.44 Additionally, later gas shells carried an explosive payload along with a 
chemical agent, creating an explosion on impact and disbursing gas.45 The 
purpose of the explosive seems to have been to prevent the shells from violating 
Hague Declaration IV and its “sole object” clause.46 Since the shells now created 
explosive blasts along with releasing chlorine or mustard gases into the air, they 
were not weapons whose “sole object” was delivery of poison gas.47 That these 
uses were not technical violations, despite clearly being uses of gas weapons, 
suggests a conundrum later treaties would struggle to solve: how can a treaty be 
specific enough to clearly state what it intends to ban, yet broad enough to cover 
weapons not yet developed or even conceived?48 
 
38. Hague Declaration IV—Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating 
Gases, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998, 187 Consol. T.S. 453 (hereinafter “Hague IV”). 
39. See Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36. See also Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. 
40. Hague IV, supra note 38. 
41. Ellwood B. Spear, Some Problems of Gas Warfare, 8 SCI. MONTHLY 275, 275 (1919). 
42. Hague IV, supra note 38. Britain became a signatory in 1907, seven years before the start of the war. 
Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Sep. 20, 2014), 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelect
ed=165 
43. Trumpener, supra note 28, at 468. 
44. Id. 
45. Spear, supra note 41, at 277. 
46. Trumpener, supra note 28, at 468. 
47. Id. 
48. Along with its lack of clarity about exactly what types of weapons it bans, Hague Declaration IV 
contains another important provision that reappears in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, the clause that it only prohibits the use of chemical weapons by one signatory against another 
signatory. Hague IV, supra note 38. Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36 art. 5; Geneva Protocol, supra 
note 7. Unlike subsequent, post-war treaties, Hague Declaration IV makes it clear that it is not banning the use 
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In the decades between the drafting of Hague Declaration IV and the Geneva 
Protocol, chemical weapons transitioned from a theoretical possibility and 
experimental curiosity to a gruesome reality of trench warfare.49 This reality 
seeped from the battlefield back to the home front, where poets like Wilfred 
Owen described the horror of a gas attack in lurid detail, capturing the image of a 
soldier “[a]s under a green sea, . . . guttering, choking, drowning.”50 Men who 
survived gas attacks brought that experience with them when they considered 
how best to face this new world where chemical gas was now a very real wartime 
threat.51 With these new perspectives on the dangers chemical weapons posed, the 
international community put forth a new agreement with stronger language that 
reflected the moral disapproval of World War I’s violations of Hague Declaration 
IV.52 
B. Washington and Geneva: Creating the New Norm 
By the end of World War I, it was clear that the Hague Conference was 
completely ineffective in preventing the use of chemical weapons, possibly 
because it was unclear what would happen if the ban was violated.53 Hague 
Declaration IV required only that the Contracting Powers “abstain” from using 
asphyxiating gases, a mild word that did little to prevent the proliferation of 
chemical gases on both sides.54 While the blanket ban on the use of particular 
types of gas shells was unique within the Conference, which mostly banned 
particular uses of technology—regarding the weapons themselves as neutral, the 
 
of chemical weapons in all circumstances, only in specific situations against signatories. Hague IV, supra note 
38. The Declaration states: 
“The present Declaration is only binding on the Contracting Powers in the case of a war between two or more of 
them.  It shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of the 
belligerents shall be joined by a non-Contracting Power.” Id.. Compare this to the language of the Geneva 
Protocol, where the High Contracting Parties “agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms 
of this declaration,” and pledge to “exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol.” 
Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. The Washington Naval Treaty contains similar language. See Washington Naval 
Treaty, supra note 36. Hague Declaration IV makes it very clear that the Declaration no longer applies 
whenever a non-Contracting Power joins a war between two or more Contracting Powers, suggesting the 
prohibition is more of a matter of contract law than an international declaration of disapproval. Hague IV, supra 
note 38. 
49. See Trumpener, supra note 28, at 460. 
50. Owen, supra note 1. 
51. See Victor Lefebure, Chemical Warfare: The Possibility of its Control, 7 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
GROTIUS SOC’Y 153, 153–54 (1921). 
52. Richard Price, A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INT’L ORG. 73, 92 (1995). There has 
been some argument that one of the reasons for the military’s willingness to ban chemical weapons is their lack 
of effectiveness. While there is some merit to this argument, it is also clear that, in the general consciousness, at 
least, chemical weapons represent a morally reprehensible method of warfare, and it is this general 
consciousness that developed following World War I, and which continues to influence how chemical weapons 
are perceived. For more of a discussion on the various arguments about effectiveness, see id. at 82–84. 
53. Id. 
54. Hague IV, supra note 38. 
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Declaration left a great deal unstated, allowing for an interpretation that followed 
the letter of the law, even while it violated the spirit.55 
By declaring chemical gas illegal in wartime, even against soldiers, what 
Hague Declaration IV did was set the stage for public outcry when it was 
violated (or appeared to be violated, according to popular opinion.)56 The 
Declaration created a new norm for the conduct of “civilized warfare,” and the 
fact that it was powerless to stop the debacle that unfolded during the First World 
War paradoxically strengthened that norm, reaffirming international disapproval 
and solidifying the idea that chemical gas needed to be banned from war.57 
This new norm appears first in the language of the 1922 Washington Naval 
Treaty, which proclaims that: 
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned 
by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such 
use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized 
Powers are parties. 
The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally 
accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice 
of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as 
between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.58 
Within the space of two sentences, the Treaty uses the word “civilized” three 
times.59 Additionally, in place of Hague Declaration IV’s “inspired by the 
sentiments which found expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 29 
November (11 December) 1868,” rationale for its ban, the Washington Naval 
Treaty makes clear that chemical gases have been “justly condemned by the 
general opinion of the civilized world,” a much stronger statement of purpose.60 
The Washington Naval Treaty never came into effect, but the language 
prohibiting chemical weapons had a direct impact on the Geneva Protocol of 
1925.61 The Geneva Protocol contains a nearly-identical statement that, “Whereas 
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion 
of the civilized world,” the High Contracting Powers agree not to use chemical 
 
55. Price, supra note 52, at 90. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 92. 
58. Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36, at art. 5 (emphasis added). 
59. Id. 
60. Hague IV, supra note 38; Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36. 
61. Price, supra note 52, at 90. Interestingly, it was France, not the United States, that prevented the treaty 
from taking force. The Senate quickly ratified the Washington Naval Treaty, but France objected to provisions 
regarding submarines, so the treaty never took effect. Daniel P. Jones, American Chemists and the Geneva 
Protocol, 71 ISIS 426, 428–29 (1980). 
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weapons against each other.62 Despite only mentioning “civilized” once, the 
Geneva Protocol makes clear the international stance against chemical warfare 
and the conviction of the High Contracting Parties to uphold this ideal.63 
Beyond moral disapproval, however, the Geneva Protocol is vague on what, 
specifically, parties may not do under its terms.64 The Protocol declares the 
prohibition on chemical weapons as “universally accepted as a part of 
International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations,” yet 
talks about “induc[ing] other States to accede to the . . . Protocol,” suggesting 
that the universality of the Protocol even at the time was not completely 
assured.65 The phrase “exert every effort to induce other States to accede” may 
suggest—but does not explicitly state—that the Protocol gives the High 
Contracting Powers the ability to use military force to ensure compliance as an 
enforcement mechanism.66 However, it seems that the chief motivating factor in 
favor of compliance was—and continues to be—fear of what might happen if 
chemical warfare is able to develop unchecked.67 That is to say, the threat of 
intervention by other nations is less of a deterrent than the perceived horrors of 
unchecked chemical warfare, particularly against one’s own nation.68 
As early as 1921, fears of what the next war would look like drove concerns 
that, without a means of control, chemical weapons would dominate any future 
conflicts.69 The perceived military effectiveness of chemical weapons, combined 
with opponents pushing for a strong ban cultivated the impression that gas and 
other chemical weapons played a much larger role in modern warfare than reality 
supported.70 
Victor Lefebure, writing in 1921, declared chemical weapons a “far too 
potent, decisive, flexible, secret, and generally dangerous [thing] to be left 
unharnessed in a world which pretends to disarm.”71 His main concern was that 
anything but strict, complete compliance with chemical disarmament would lead 
to the few hold-out powers gaining too much control over warfare and 
threatening peace.72 This concern over national defense, coupled with American 
exceptionalism and isolationist tendencies in the first half of the 20th century, 
drove the American Chemical Warfare Service branch of the United States Army 
 





67. Price, supra note 52, at 93. 
68. Id. 
69. Lefebure, supra note 51, at 156. 
70. Price, supra note 52, at 93. See also Lefebure, supra note 51, at 155–58. (discussing the perceived 
relative effectiveness of chemical weapons as cheaper, deadlier alternatives to conventional weaponry). 
71. Lefebure, supra note 51, at 157. 
72. See generally id. 
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to successfully lobby to prevent American ratification of the Geneva Protocol.73 It 
was not until late 1969 that President Richard Nixon finally announced he would 
seek the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify the Geneva Protocol, forty-
four years after it was first drafted, and well after it had generally come to be 
accepted as customary international law.74 
The American pro-chemical weapons arguments parallel the concerns 
Lefebure puts forth, but come to the opposite conclusion.75 Rather than believing 
that the horrors of gas warfare made complete disarmament a likelihood, a 
number of Americans championed the cause of chemical warfare as the more 
humane way of the future and saw agreement to the Geneva Protocol as 
hamstringing America’s position in future wars.76 Most of those proponents of 
chemical weapons were chemists and members of such organizations as the 
Chemical Foundation.77 Because of groups like the Chemical Foundation, 
America did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until the Nixon Administration.78 
 
73. Jones, supra note 61, at 420. 
74. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853. 
75. See J. M. Scammell, Chemical Warfare in the Future, 216 N. Am. Rev. 476, 479–80 (1922). 
76. Id. at 80.). Scammell cites some dubious statistics in his article to support this position and focuses his 
argument that gas is generally non-lethal and more humane than conventional weapons around the number of 
gas-related casualties and deaths in the American Army during the War. See id. at 480. There are a few issues 
with these statistics that would suggest unreliability. To begin with, Scammell discounts the possibility that gas 
causes tuberculosis (or at least increases a survivor’s susceptibility to the disease) and claims that it does not 
mutilate or disfigure, which is contrary to many accounts of survivors of gas attacks who lived with diminished 
lung capacity from scarring, not to mention psychological damage. Id. at 480; See E. Jones, B. Everitt, S. 
Ironside, I. Palmer and S. Wessely, Psychological Effects of Chemical Weapons: A Follow-up Study of First 
World War Veterans, 38 PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE 1419, 1419–26 (2008) (discussing the various symptoms 
reported by survivors of gas attacks and attempting to determine which were psychological). This suggests that 
his figure for deaths from gas attacks is limited only to battlefield casualties and thus is a low estimate of the 
actual deaths caused by poison gas. On top of that, by focusing only on American casualties, Scammell looks at 
only the period of time America was involved in the war, from April of 1917 to November 11, 1918. American 
Entry into World War I, 1917, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (May 26, 2014), 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/wwi. Since, realistically, the bulk of the American Army did not 
arrive in Europe until early 1918, his numbers at most look at around a fourth of the entire war, from only one 
side. See id. Along the same lines, the Americans arrived at the end of the war, after both sides had developed 
more effective defenses against chemical weapons, so one would expect American casualties to be much lower. 
See generally Spear, supra note 41 (explaining the evolution of gas disbursal methods and gas masks during the 
war). 
77. Jones, supra note 61, at 426. 
78. Id. at 427.  While the pressure these groups exerted so successfully may indicate a belief in the utility 
and importance of chemical weapons for America’s future, the actual public sentiment is more difficult to 
extrapolate from America’s apparent support of chemical warfare, since the outpouring of pro-chemical 
weapons polemics from American chemists were as likely to be responses to vilification of their profession by 
the American public as genuine expressions of deeply-held beliefs. See id. This concern over the perception of 
chemistry as aiding chemical weapons lingers within chemists’ societies today, but rather than producing 
opposition to restrictions, these concerns promote the gap between legitimate and illegitimate uses of chemicals, 
increasing the vilification of chemical weapons by juxtaposing it against chemists aiming to improve society. 
See Brief for the American Chemistry Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16, Bond v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No. 12-158). See infra III.B for more discussion of the ratification 
process. 
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A better indicator of where Americans stood on the issue of chemical 
weapons was not whether the Geneva Protocol was ratified, but whether it was 
followed in the next war, despite the lack of any binding international legal 
restraints on American decision-making.79 
III. THE SECOND WORLD WAR & THE COLD WAR: CONSOLIDATION OF NORMS 
A. The Second World War: The Establishment of an International Taboo and 
the First Test of Geneva80 
Despite the apparent victory of the chemical weapons lobby in the interwar 
years, every American president during those years, beginning with Warren G. 
Harding, supported abolishing chemical weapons use.81 However, when war 
broke out in Europe in 1939, anticipating the potential advent of a new round of a 
chemical warfare Armageddon, the American Chemical Warfare Service began 
to re-arm in preparation for attacks.82 Given the flagrant breaches of Hague 
Declaration IV in the last world war83 and the relative lack of specific legal 
restraints contained within the Geneva Protocol itself,84 it should be rather 
surprising then that the major powers in the European theater refrained from 
unleashing chemical weapons against each other.85 
This is not to say that chemical weapons never made an appearance after 
World War I.86 There have been a number of infractions following the signing of 
the Geneva Protocol, including Spain’s use of its remaining World War I arsenal 
against Moroccan rebels shortly after the Protocol was concluded.87 Italy also 
unleashed chemical weapons against the Ethiopians in its conquest of that region 
during World War II.88 Both of these instances involve a European nation using 
chemical gas against a non-European population, revealing a remnant of the 
attitudes contained in the old Hague Declaration IV in that there seems to have 
 
79. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience, 8 
Int’l. Security 3, 7 (1984). 
80. While perhaps the best-known use of chemical weapons during World War II is Zyklon-B, used for 
mass killings in concentration camps during the Holocaust, I have chosen not to include that example in my 
analysis because the Holocaust and all its horrors is so beyond the scale of anything contemplated by the 
drafters of the Geneva Protocol, it would require a separate article to do justice to all the unique issues it raises. 
See generally At the Killing Centers, THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM (May 26, 2014), 
http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007714. 
81. Van Courtland Moon, supra note 79, at 7. 
82. Id., at 9–10. 
83. Price, supra note 52, at 92. 
84. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 7; see also Price, supra note 52, at 75. 
85. Moon, supra note 79, at 9. 
86. W. Michael Reisman, Chemical Weapons: Designing Operable Systems for Enforcing Restraint, 83 
PROC. ANN. MEETING, AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. L. 468, 469 (1989). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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been little international concern about this type of use.89 However, it is significant 
that neither of these nations tried to expand their targets to European countries at 
the time.90 Given that much of the debate over chemical weapons proliferation in 
Europe during the years between the First and Second World War centered 
around apocalyptic imaginings of the destruction of civilization through chemical 
weapons, it is perhaps not surprising than none of the major European powers 
chose to turn their chemical stash against another power they considered able to 
retaliate in kind.91 
In fact, in many ways it appears that concerns about retaliation drove at least 
Allied decision makers more than concern for international law.92 While 
President Roosevelt began his 1943 speech enunciating the American stance on 
the use of chemical weapons by noting that their use “has been outlawed by the 
general opinion of civilized mankind,”93 the remainder of the speech made it clear 
that the United States intended to retaliate if Axis powers attacked with chemical 
weapons, and discussions among high-level military officials indicate that 
chemical weapons were ruled out by the Allies as a viable tactical option not 
because they were illegal, but because they could lead to gas warfare in theaters 
of war less prepared for a chemical attack.94 That Geneva’s ban on chemical 
weapons had stood throughout the war served to strengthen the general 
perception that chemical weapons were of a unique and dangerous character and 
reinforced the notion that chemical weapons had no place in “civilized” warfare.95 
Interestingly, the Allies seemed more willing to consider the use of gas in 
World War II than the Nazis, due to Hitler’s experience with gas in the trenches 
of World War I, again suggesting that, at least at this point, international law was 
much less of a consideration than retaliation in determining chemical weapons 
policy.96 Regardless of the reasons, however, the Second World War established 
that it was possible to conduct a war in the modern era without the use of 
 
89. See id. 
90. See id. at 469. As Hague Declaration IV was concerned mainly with preventing the use of chemical 
weapons between signatories, some element of that mentality may have carried over into the mindset of European 
nations interpreting the Geneva Protocol in that Morocco did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until 1970 and Ethiopia 
had just ratified the Protocol in 1935, the same year Italy invaded. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925, 
ICRC: TREATIES AND STATES PARTIES TO SUCH TREATIES (May 14, 2012), http://www.icrc.org/applic/ 
ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=280; See Lina Grip and 
John Hart, The Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1935–36 Italo-Ethiopian War, SIPRI Arms Control and Non-
proliferation Programme, 1, 1 (2009), available at http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/chemical/ 
publications/. 
91. Moon, supra note 79, at 5; see also Reisman, supra note 86. at 469. 
92. Moon, supra note 79, at 14–19. 
93. Id. at 14. 
94. Id. at 14–19. 
95. Price, supra note 52, at 96. 
96. Moon, supra note 79, at 25–26. 
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chemical weapons, and that precedent would foster the growing image of 
chemical weapons as “inhumane” in the decades that followed.97 
B.  The Second Half of the 20th Century: Rogue States and the “Poor Man’s 
Bomb”98 
Forty-four years after the Geneva Protocol was originally drafted, Richard 
Nixon brought the treaty before the Senate to ask advice and consent on ratifying 
an agreement that, even at the time, was considered to be customary international 
law.99 Part of American reluctance to sign on to Geneva centered around debates 
about whether chemicals like tear gas or anti-plant agents fall under the broad 
umbrella of the Protocol’s prohibition of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases.”100 The United States used various herbicides, the most famous of which 
was Agent Orange, to destroy forests providing cover for the Viet-Cong in 
Vietnam, and to destroy crops providing food to the enemy.101 Concerns over the 
applicability of the Geneva Protocol to chemicals like Agent Orange prompted 
the U.S. to vote against a 1969 Resolution specifying that Geneva applied to 
“[a]ny chemical agents of warfare-chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid 
or solid-which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, 
animals or plants.”102 
Despite these concerns, the United States ratified the Geneva Protocol on 
January 22, 1975.103 Given U.S. reticence to sign on to the Protocol, it should be 
unsurprising that the American response to the first use of chemical weapons in 
warfare since the U.S. ratified the treaty was tempered more by concern about 
political relations than about compliance with the spirit of the Protocol.104 
 
97. Price, supra note 52, at 73. 
98. Id. 
99. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853. 
100. Id. at 855. 
101. Agent Orange, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/8993/ 
Agent-Orange (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). Agent Orange, while the most famous, was not the only herbicide the 
US used in Vietnam. In fact, a variety of others were used, but gained less notoriety. The chemicals were given 
color names based on the color-coded bands on their storage drums. Id. 
102. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 865; G.A. Res. 2603 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2603 (Dec. 16, 1969). 
103. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/ 
t/isn/4784.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). Gerald Ford was the president who actually ratified the Protocol, 
after the Senate unanimously voted for its approval. This was almost exactly fifty years from when the treaty 
was first signed, and forty-seven years after it came into effect. Id. 
104. Glen Kessler, History Lesson: When the United States Looked the Other Way on Chemical Weapons, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2013) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/ 
2013/09/04/history-lesson-when-the-united-states-looked-the-other-way-on-chemical-weapons/. 
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During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis deployed chemical weapons against Iran, 
manufactured from materials often supplied by American sources.105 By 1983, 
State Department intelligence reports declared that Iraq was deploying chemical 
weapons against Iran on an almost daily basis, yet Americans did not intervene in 
any way.106 In fact, the United States was assisting the Iraqis with battlefield 
intelligence.107 
Why such a lack of American outrage at the blatant use of chemical 
weapons? One possibility is that American policymakers were more concerned 
with the possible rise of Iran than the breach of the Geneva Protocol.108 The war 
between Iran and Iraq began in 1980, the year after the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
placed Ayatollah Khomeini in power109, and American sentiment toward Iran was 
fairly hostile.110 
This lack of response, or at least lack of affirmative response, illustrates one 
of the largest flaws in the Geneva Protocol, namely that, without a specific 
mechanism for enforcement, compliance hinges on its signatories’ willingness to 
require other nations to uphold its prohibitions.111 In the case of the Iran-Iraq War, 
the Protocol’s prohibitions simply were not strong enough to overcome American 
political concerns and interests in Iraqi victory, allowing the American 
government to simply ignore clear evidence of chemical weapons use by its 
allies.112 The response of the U.N. was hardly more effective.113 After an extensive 
investigation, the U.N. Security Council stated that they were “profoundly 
concerned” about the findings that Iraq had used chemical weapons, and 
“strongly condemned” continued use in violation of the Protocol.114 The Security 
Council and the General Assembly both issued a number of similar statements, 
declaring that they expected compliance with the Protocol and that they 







109. Roger Hardy, The Iran-Iraq War: 25 Years on, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm. 
110. Kessler, supra, note 104. America had long had a special relationship with the Shah, after a 1953 
CIA-backed coup installed him in power. When the Shah came to America for cancer treatment in 1979, a mob 
of Iranian students overran the American Embassy in Tehran. Fifty-two American embassy workers remained 
hostages in Iran until the end of President Carter’s term in office, despite attempts to free them. The Iranian 
Hostage Crisis, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE , http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-
article/carter-hostage-crisis/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
111. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. 
112. Kessler supra, note 104.; Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. 
113. Timothy L. H. McCormack, International Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War, 
21 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 21, 21 (1991). 
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C. Remodeling the Taboo: The Chemical Weapons Convention 
In an effort to strengthen the prohibitions on chemical weapons, and to 
clarify what could and could not be traded, the nations of the world came 
together in 1993 to create a new, more extensive treaty on chemical weapons.116 
One of the most important additions the new Chemical Weapons Convention 
introduced was a verification process, instituting a means for the international 
community to inspect for compliance with the treaty, and setting up a process for 
destruction of prohibited chemicals.117 A considerably more extensive document 
than the Geneva Protocol, the CWC sought to define “chemical weapons” as 
more than just the “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices,”118 the CWC lays out the following definition of 
chemical weapons: 
(a)  Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
quantities are consistent with such purposes; 
(b)  Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other 
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in 
subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment 
of such munitions and devices; 
(c)  Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection 
with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph 
(b).119 
While this is a much longer definition, it still suffers from the same broad 
language that characterizes the Geneva Protocol, particularly in the range of 
substances that can be classified as a “toxic chemical,” which the CWC defines 
as “Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”120 In 
fact, while the CWC does include an Annex, with certain specific chemicals 
listed, not only is this list non-exhaustive, but the guidelines for determining 
whether a new chemical falls under the Schedule of chemicals can be read nearly 
 
116. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, preamble. 
117. See David A. Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms: Extraterritoriality and the Draft Chemical 
Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 25 (1990). 
118. Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. 
119. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. II. 
120. Id. For more explanation of how broad this definition is in practice, see the discussion of the Bond 
case, infra Part IV.B. 
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as broadly and mostly relate to the Verification Annex and reporting 
requirements.121 
The CWC sets out a detailed plan for the systematic destruction of chemical 
weapons by the signatories and creates a new body, the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“the Organization”), to oversee compliance.122 
However, it is unclear what specific measures will follow a violation, as the 
remedy for cases of “particular gravity” is for the members of the Convention to 
refer the matter to the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council.123 
Additionally, the powers of the Organization are restricted to enforcing 
compliance among member States.124 
IV. A NATION IN REVOLT & A JEALOUS RIVAL: CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
A. The Syrian Problem: Enforcing the Ban against a Nation in Revolt 
In the early morning hours of August 21, 2013, Syrian government forces 
launched a series of missiles, loaded with sarin gas, at about half a dozen 
neighborhoods controlled by rebel forces.125 The warheads, Soviet-era M-14 
surface-to-surface rockets, were able to carry between 11 and 16 gallons of 
chemical agent apiece, with several missiles found at each attack site.126 Sarin is a 
nerve agent, an airborne poison gas that is odorless, colorless, and tasteless, 
making it difficult to detect.127 It attacks the nervous system and can cause death 
within minutes128, while those who survive exposure experience a range of 
 
121. Id. at Annex on Chemical Weapons. The Guidelines do insert language that can be read as 
narrowing, describing, for example, Schedule 1 chemicals as those that have “little to no use for purposes not 
prohibited under this convention.” Id. at Annex for Chemicals, (A)(1)(c). The problem with this limitation, 
though, is that it may be both overbroad and under-inclusive, depending on what situation may arise. While a 
vast improvement over the Geneva Protocol, the detailed classification standards of the CWC are still less than 
adequate to prevent the use of chemical weapons by a determined nation. 
122. Id. at art. IV, art. VIII. 
123. Id. at art. XII. The CWC also suggests that, for cases where a party has been requested to take action 
and has failed to do so, the Conference can suspend that party’s rights and privileges under the CWC until it is 
in compliance. For more serious matters, the Conference “may recommend collective measures to States Parties 
in conformity with international law.” CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 
45, art. XII. 
124. Id. at art. VIII. 
125. Joby Warrick, More Than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says, THE 
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symptoms, “including shortness of breath, disorientation, eye irritation, blurred 
vision, nausea, vomiting and general weakness.”129 
The American response was considerably more disapproving than the 
response to the Iran-Iraq War use of chemical weapons, but remained cautious 
while the details of the attack were still under investigation.130 As early as June of 
2013, the U.S. had raised concerns that Syria was using chemical weapons 
against rebel forces, and while talk of aid and the possibility of establishing a No-
Fly Zone came from the White House, ultimately the international community 
took a different step to prevent Syria’s continued use of chemical agents.131 
When the attacks took place, Syria was not a signatory to the CWC.132 
However, as international pressure mounted, Syria’s Assad regime, already 
bound by the Geneva Protocol, agreed to become a party to the CWC.133 The 
CWC’s Organization set forth an accelerated plan for the destruction of Syria’s 
weapons134 and the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution on September 27, 
2013 to further implement this program.135 The U.S., Russia, and NATO then 
began working out the details of the long process of destroying Syria’s extensive 
chemical weapons cache.136 
How voluntary Syria’s agreement to sign the CWC raises issues about the 
enforceability of a ban on chemical weapons where even the treaty with the most 
teeth is limited by its applicability to only signatories, one of the concerns raised 
by the post-World War I scholars regarding any type of meaningful prohibition 
of chemical weapons.137 With help from Russia, Syria acceded to international 
pressure fairly easily, but that in itself raises the question of what would happen 
with a more defiant regime, or a less united international front.138 
 
129. Id. 
130. In the intervening years between Reagan’s response to the Iran-Iraq War and Obama’s steps in 
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132. See Freedman, supra note 5. 
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135. S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc, S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
136. Gabriela Baczynska & Adrian Croft, Exclusive: Russia, NATO Plan Joint Operation on Syria’s 
Chemical Weapons, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/14/us-syria-crisis-russia-
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137. See Freedman, supra note 5. 
138. Id. 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
349 
The issue is compounded by the fact that, despite a number of breaches of the 
Geneva Protocol, there is no real historical blueprint for an acceptable 
international community’s response in Syria, since the general response 
throughout history has been fairly weak at best.139 Even using the response to the 
last confirmed use of chemical weapons in warfare by Iraq provides little 
guidance, as the U.S. did nothing, and the U.N. did little more than pass 
resolutions expressing disapproval; neither of these responses is likely to bring 
about an end to the use of chemical weapons by a determined regime.140 
Given America’s pattern of lukewarm enthusiasm for controls on chemical 
weapons, it is somewhat difficult to exert influence by claiming the moral high 
ground in this matter, another factor to consider regarding enforcement.141 
Additionally, this moral authority, the U.S. Government claims, is at stake in a 
case raising the issue of whether a statute enacting the CWC can be brought to 
bear against an individual.142 
B. Bond v. United States: Chemical Weapons in Everyday Life? 
The phrase “chemical weapons” evokes images of war-torn landscapes and 
battered soldiers or civilians, struggling to breathe as they run from militarized 
death. It does not generally call to mind a Pennsylvania woman sneaking around 
the car and mailbox of a romantic rival and covering the other woman’s door 
knobs and car handles with ill-concealed chemicals.143 Yet a grand jury in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Carol Anne Bond with possessing and 
using a chemical weapon under 18 U.S.C. section 229, the statute implementing 
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, for attempting to poison Myrlinda 
Haynes with chemicals stolen from work and ordered on the internet.144 
Bond’s story seems more at home on a soap opera than at the center of a 
debate over federalism and an international chemical weapons treaty. Haynes and 
Bond had been friends, and when Haynes announced she was pregnant, Bond 
was initially excited.145 Upon learning that the father of Haynes’s child was none 
other than Bond’s own husband, however, Bond decided to exact revenge 
through poison.146 Trained as a microbiologist and employed by the chemical 
manufacturer Rohm and Haas, Bond stole toxic chemicals from work and 
 
139. See supra Parts II , III, for a discussion of the international community’s responses after World War 
I, World War II, and the Iran-Iraq War. 
140. See Kessler, supra note 104; McCormack, supra note 113, at 21–28. 
141. See supra Parts II & III, for a discussion of U.S. reluctance to agree to sign onto the Geneva 
Protocol. 
142. Richey, supra note 14 
143. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009) rev’d and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180 
L. Ed. 2d 269 (U.S. 2011). 
144. Id. at 131–32 
145. Id. at 131. 
146. Id. 
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ordered others over the internet.147 She then spread these chemicals on Haynes’s 
doorknob, car door handles, and mailbox numerous times over the course of 
several months.148 While these chemicals are toxic and have the potential to cause 
a great deal of harm, the worst injury Haynes sustained was a chemical burn to 
her thumb on one occasion, mostly because Bond’s efforts at concealment were 
inept enough that Haynes generally was able to avoid the chemicals.149 
When the local police suggested that the substance left around Haynes’s 
house could be cocaine but did little else to help, Haynes contacted the United 
States Postal Inspection Service, which set up surveillance cameras around 
Haynes’s house and caught Bond stealing an envelope from Haynes’s mailbox 
and placing chemicals inside the muffler of Haynes’s car.150 For these actions, 
Bond faced two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon under 18 
U.S.C. section 229.151 
The federal statute that prosecutors charged Bond under makes it a criminal 
offence for any person, other than those authorized by law, to knowingly 
“develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, 
stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical 
weapon.”152 A chemical weapon as defined by the statute constitutes any “toxic 
chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited 
under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a 
purpose;”153 practically identical wording to the definition of chemical weapons 
in the Chemical Weapons Convention.154 Both the statute and the convention 
define “toxic chemical” as “any chemical which through its chemical action on 
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to 
humans or animals.”155 
While the Bond case presents issues of federalism and the power of Congress 
to enact legislation implementing treaties,156 it also illustrates the scope of 
possible substances that could fall within the convention’s definition of “toxic 
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153. 18 U.S.C.A. § 229(f)(1)(A) (West 2013). 
154. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art 2. Note that the only 
change in wording is that “convention” becomes “chapter” in the American statute. 
155. Id. 
156. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2012) rev’d and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 
2077(2014). In fact, the case was decided on Federalism grounds, with the majority declining to reach 
interpreting the Chemical Weapons Convention, instead finding that Congressional intent in enacting the statute 
could not have possibly meant to cover acts of attempted poisoning at the state level without a clear indication 
otherwise. United States v. Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) 
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chemical.”157 During oral arguments of the case before the Supreme Court on 
November 5, 2013, Justice Alito noted that, under the strictest reading of the 
terms of the statutory definition of “toxic chemical,” chocolate would be banned 
because it is harmful to dogs and therefore meets a strictly literal interpretation of 
the definition.158 The Court found that there was no indication that Congress 
intended the statute to have such a broad interpretation, and decided that 
“chemical weapon” should be interpreted closer to the popular idea of the term, 
regardless of the literal text of the statute.159 While the idea that the purpose of 
Congress, or the framers of the convention, was to ban chocolate is absurd, the 
comment raises two very important concerns surrounding the enforcement of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention: What actually constitutes a chemical weapon, 
and just how common are they? 
The answer to the first of these questions will suggest an answer to the 
second, as it becomes easier to figure out how common chemical weapons are 
once they are defined. Unfortunately, none of the chemical weapons treaties of 
the 20th century offer any real guidance in determining what is not a chemical 
weapon, only in suggesting things that could be.160 Therefore, in order to better 
understand what a chemical weapon is, we need to look back at the evolution of 
chemical weapons bans in the 20th century, where it becomes clear that the types 
of chemicals the original signatories of the Geneva Protocol envisioned were 
those used by nations against enemy combatants.161 Why, then, was this not 
spelled out? 
One reason for the ambiguous language could be to ensure that the Protocol 
and its progeny would apply to broader international situations as they arose, 
rather than requiring a new treaty every time one nation thought up a new 
chemical weapon, or a different use for an old one.162 While maintaining a “know 
 
157. See CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. 2. Indeed, 
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in the Bond case makes exactly this point, finding that the definition of 
chemical weapon, as expressed in 18 U.S.C.A.§ 229, does in fact encompass Bond’s actions and would 
therefore have decided the case on constitutionality grounds. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094–95(Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
158. Lyle Dennison, Argument Recap: A Tense Hour at the Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 5, 2013, 12:54 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/argument-recap-a-tense-hour-at-the-court/. Justice Alito was 
describing the American statutory definition of “toxic chemical,” but as the wording of the American statute 
and the definition in the convention are identical, his comments could be equally applied to either. Bond, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2084; Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 229(f)(1)(A) (West 2013) with CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 art. 2. 
159. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093. 
160. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. See also G.A. Res. 2603 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2603 (Dec. 16, 1969); CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, 
art. 2. 
161. See, e.g., Lefebure, supra note 51, at 153. 
162. See generally Scammell, supra note 75. Scammell describes the evolution of chemical warfare over 
the course of three years during World War I, suggesting the idea that rapid development of new technologies 
would have been something his contemporaries were familiar with and may have considered in their drafting of 
the Geneva Protocol. 
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it when I see it” standard for chemical weapons163 might make sense in that 
context, this standard makes it easy to dilute the power of labeling something a 
“chemical weapon” in the international community by labeling a disparate array 
of chemicals used as “weapons,” rather than confining the term to the more 
traditional concept.164 When coupled with the lack of definite enforcement 
mechanisms, the danger becomes more apparent.165 The most powerful 
enforcement mechanism for the Geneva Protocol and the CWC is the 
international community’s fear of and moral outrage against chemical weapons.166 
By being able to classify routine poisonings as violations of the CWC, it removes 
the power behind that outrage at such an unusual violation of the rules of 
civilized warfare and reduces it to the commonplace.167 
V. DESIGNING A NEW APPROACH 
A.  Clarifying the Definition of Chemical Weapons 
While the CWC expanded the definition of chemical weapons beyond the 
“asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices” of the Geneva Protocol, it did little to clear up what was—or more 
precisely, what was not—covered by its definition.168 The drafters of the Geneva 
Protocol were writing ten years after the first major use of chemical weapons in a 
theater of war and with knowledge of the horrors these types of weapons can 
cause.169 That knowledge is, thankfully, no longer common experience across the 
 
163. In essence, this is the standard for defining a chemical weapon under 18 U.S.C.A. § 229 that the 
Court adopts in Bond case, noting that taking the definition to reach as broadly as possible would produce 
absurd results. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090–92. 
164. See Price, supra note 52, at 96 (1995). Price describes the usual course of moral outrage against a 
particular weapon as such: “the historical record indicates that moral qualms about the use of novel technologies 
of destruction issue most prominently (if not surprisingly) from those upon whom the weapons initially are 
inflicted. Moral objections may continue once the monopoly is lost and the initial victim incorporates the new 
weapon (as with the crossbow), but the overwhelming tendency is for such moral concerns to fall by the 
wayside as the possibilities of technology are embraced by more than one party,” but points out that, at least so 
far, gas shells have not followed this path. Id. 
165. See supra Parts II.B, III.C, and IV.A, for a discussion of the lack of enforcement mechanisms in 
place. 
166. Compare Moon, supra note 79, at 14–19 (describing U.S. concerns about wartime retaliation) with 
Kessler, supra note 104 (describing U.S. indifference during the Iran-Iraq War), suggesting that, between moral 
outrage and fear of consequences, fear is a stronger motivation. See also Reisman, supra note 86, at 470. 
167. One possible distinction regarding how chemical weapons use could be charged might be the 
difference between use by a state or organized group as opposed to use by an individual. The CWC suggests 
this could be a distinction, given the wording of Article I, but never explicitly states this. See CWC, supra note 
17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 art. 1. 
168. Compare Geneva Protocol, supra note 7 with CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 
(1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. II to see the way each document defines a chemical weapon. 
169. Trumpener, supra note 28, at 460–61. See supra Part II.A, for a discussion about the experiences and 
concerns of the post-World War I world. 
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globe, but this raises the issue of whether a broad definitions of what constitutes 
a chemical weapon serves to really protect against their use.170 
Because enforcement of the ban on chemical weapons is so dependent on 
their perceived unique nature, defining what they are not is as important as 
defining what they are, and will help facilitate enforcement by giving countries 
notice about what is and is not acceptable use of substances that can have both 
lethal and non-lethal uses, along with suggesting appropriate action for different 
levels of violation.171 While the Bond case provides the most extreme case of 
confusion over the magnitude of what the CWC covers,172 the Geneva Protocol’s 
wording raises questions as to whether it covers only lethal or potentially lethal 
agents, or whether compounds such as tear gas are also included in the ban.173 
An effective way of counteracting this confusion might be to modify the 
schedule of chemicals and chemical weapons listed in the CWC Annex, which 
currently is a non-exhaustive list with basic guidelines for including other 
chemicals similar to those listed, such as how similar its chemical composition is 
to a listed chemical.174 Beyond just classifying each known, agreed-upon 
chemical weapon into levels, these categories could be modified to create two 
additional sub-sets of classifications with corresponding consequences for use 
under particular circumstances.175 Lethal chemicals, such as chlorine and mustard 
gas, and nerve agents like sarin, used in particular ways, would occupy the first 
level, as major offenses, and their use would bring about strong international 
action.176 While not binding on those nations that do not agree to the 
modification, such an amendment would memorialize the kind of reaction the 
international community considers appropriate for a breach, requiring political 
justification for more lenient measures. 
A second level would encompass non-lethal chemical weapons, or chemicals 
intended to be non-lethal, but which have deleterious effects, such as tear gas or 
 
170. See supra Part III.A , B, for a discussion on incidents of chemical warfare since the adoption of the 
Geneva Protocol. 
171. See, e.g., Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853–54; Reisman, supra note 86, at 470. 
172. Dennison, supra note 158. 
173. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853–54. 
174. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, Annex on Chemical 
Weapons. 
175. Such a scheme could be worked as a modification of the existing CWC, provided all the parties to 
the CWC agreed to its amendment. The changes would not be binding on parties that choose not to agree, nor 
would it bind third parties. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, March 26-May 
24, 1968, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Part IV, art. 39 et seq. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 
(May 23, 1969) (hereinafter “Vienna Convention”). 
176. The CWC sets up the international legal framework for this to take place within Article XII, where 
the Conference may recommend measures to ensure compliance in the event of a breach. In combination with 
the recommendations in Part V(B), infra., this would provide a more specific set of guidelines than the CWC 
currently has. See CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art XII. 
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herbicides used in warfare.177 This additional level of classification would allow 
greater discretion for the international community to take into account specific 
circumstances in responding, including the purpose of the chemical’s use, how 
widespread the effects were, and whether other, viable, non-chemical options 
were available to achieve this purpose.178 To protect the aim of inclusiveness 
behind the broad definitions of chemical weapons in current treaties, this 
schedule would not be considered exhaustive, and the Organization created by 
the CWC would have the power to review new types of chemical weapons to 
determine which level best describes their characteristics, but it would focus 
more on the lethality of chemicals than the current Schedules.179 Significantly, 
both schedules could explicitly set out circumstances and factors where use of 
their particular chemicals would not be considered a violation of the CWC, 
providing a compliment to the current list of factors meant to determine whether 
something is a chemical weapon.180 The new classifications could work in tandem 
with the current Schedules under the CWC, with the existing system suggesting 
the severity of the violation and the new schedule providing guidance for 
enforcement. 
B. Agreeing on Enforcement Mechanisms 
While the number of violations of the Geneva Protocol and its progeny has 
been relatively low, the response to those violations has been less than 
exemplary.181 The response to Syria’s latest use of sarin gas is, to date, the most 
extensive proactive international action against a nation that has violated the 
prohibitions on chemical weapons.182 Much of this has to do with the ambiguous 
 
177. For a discussion on the debate over whether tear gas and Agent Orange qualify as asphyxiating 
substances under the Geneva Protocol, see Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 856–57. 
178. The standard of review I envision here is similar to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding 
Dormant Commerce Clause issues. For an explanation of that standard, see Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 
U.S. 349, 354–56 (1951). 
179. To prevent this provision from running afoul of the non-retroactivity clause of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the wording of the schedule would need to include that the list was non-
exclusive and that chemicals analogous to those listed would also be considered to violate the prohibition. If the 
descriptions of what characteristics define each level are specific enough, this would serve to put nations on 
notice. Vienna Convention, supra note 175, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Part III, sec. 2, art. 28 et seq.). 
180. See CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, Annex on Chemical 
Weapons. The concern about whether poisoning a goldfish to send a message to a governor, Godfather-style, 
could be enough under the current wording to push the use of detergent into the category of terrorism and 
assassination covered by the CWC could also be addressed by this classification, as detergent, generally 
intended to be non-lethal, would fall under the second category, where the relatively minor impact of its use on 
a single goldfish would point to it being classified as not a chemical weapon; See Bond v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 2077, 2097 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurrence). 
181. See Parts II.B, III. 
182. Compare Baczynska & Croft, supra note 136 with, e.g., Glen Kessler, History Lesson: When the 
United States Looked the Other Way on Chemical Weapons, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2013) available 
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nature of what the Geneva Protocol and the CWC require when there is a 
breach.183 The CWC allows nations to take the “necessary measures” to ensure 
compliance, but does not specify beyond that, allowing nations to substitute 
national aims for international action.184 
One solution to this problem is to create more specific examples of 
consequences for violating the chemical weapons prohibition, tying the level of 
the violation to the international action.185 
Use of a level one chemical, for example, would be a serious infraction, and 
could lead to economic sanctions or military intervention, along with the disposal 
requirements already in place under the CWC.186 While still allowing for final 
decisions to be made by the Security Council or General Assembly of the U.N., 
specifying the types of international responses likely to result from a violation of 
each level of the prohibition would create more certainty and uniformity in the 
application of the prohibition and would discourage nations from ignoring 
violations for political reasons.187 
Of course, none of these modifications to the CWC would have the power to 
bind any nation that is not already a party to the CWC.188 This does not mean, 
however, that a state that is not a party to either agreement can use chemical 
weapons with unchecked impunity.189 Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Security Council has the power to act on any threats it 
determines to be a breach of the peace, and is authorized to make decisions 
regarding what methods to use combating such threats.190 Arguably the use of 
chemical weapons, as defined by the international community would fall under a 
breach of the peace, and with more definite parameters for enforcement, it may 
be easier to convince the Security Council to act. 
Additionally, though the Geneva Protocol’s specified prohibitions fall short 
of those this Comment proposes, they are customary international law, and 
therefore, a non-party state that uses chemical weapons might be subject to 




183. Geneva Protocol, supra note 7; CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 
U.N.T.S. 45, art. XII. 
184. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art XII. 
185. See supra Part V.A. 
186. These actions are currently possible under the CWC, but not specified, and therefore easier to avoid 
for political reasons. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. XII. See 
supra Part V.A, for a discussion on what constitutes a level one chemical weapon. 
187. The CWC already provides for U.N. intervention, but a clarification of the likely results of a 
violation would improve the ability to enforce the agreement.  CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 
(1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 art. XII. 
188. Vienna Convention, supra note 175, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Part III, sec. 4, art. 34 . 
189. U.N. Charter ch. VII, art. 39. The Geneva Protocol is generally considered customary international 
law, and therefore binding on all states. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853. 
190. U.N. Charter ch. VII, art. 39. 
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provisions.191 While the specific proposed provisions in this Comment would not 
apply in a situation where a state was party to neither agreement—or even where 
a state was only a signatory of the Geneva Protocol—having a defined concept of 
an appropriate response under the proposed clarifications could help direct the 
international community’s response in situations where the legal standing is less 
clear, or where chemical weapons are used by a non-state actor.192 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ambiguity is nothing new in chemical weapons agreements, nor is a lack of 
clearly defined enforcement mechanisms.193 The Geneva Protocol—now 
considered customary international law—was born out of the anxieties of post-
World War I Europe.194 There was a fear that, “Unless [chemical weapons 
development was] checked, [Europe would] find nations working on diverging 
lines of protective and aggressive chemical warfare.”195 A broad definition of 
“chemical weapons” would have helped further that cause by including the 
known weapons of World War I with any new weapons that could be invented.196 
While that ambiguity makes it possible to bring in international organizations 
to coordinate the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons197 and to 
charge a jealous wife with using chemicals against her rival,198 this does not 
necessarily mean the treaty is stronger or easier to enforce because its ambiguity 
allows both readings. In fact, widening the possible applications of the treaty may 
actually weaken the most powerful enforcement mechanism of any chemical 
weapons treaty: the perception of chemical weapons as rare and uniquely heinous 
instruments of war that must be avoided by civilized nations.199 
 
191. See Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853. This issue did not arise with Syria because, although 
not a party to the CWC prior to the attacks on Ghouta, Syria was a signatory to the Geneva Protocol. S.C. Res. 
2118, U.N. Doc, S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
192. Vienna Convention, supra note 175 , U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Part III, sec. 4, art. 34. For 
guidance on how to interpret the Geneva Protocol, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that 
treaties should be read in context with subsequent agreements between the parties. Id. While, again, this would 
not absolutely control the actions of signatory states dealing with non-signatory states, the agreements between 
signatory states as to how they will deal with each other could suggest possible solutions to dealing with third 
party violators. See id. 
193. See Hague IV, supra note 38. See also Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. 
194. Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. 
195. Lefebure, supra note 51, at 156. 
196. See id. at 157. 
197. Chemical Arms Watchdog Adopts Syria Stockpile Plan, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2013, 4:33 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24966482. 
198. Richey, supra note 14. 
199. See Reisman, supra note 86 at 468–69. Reisman discusses a number of myths surrounding the use of 
chemical weapons, challenging the idea that they are especially cruel or unusual. Id. Despite concluding that 
general compliance with chemical weapons treaties is a myth, Reisman’s discussion of these “myths” suggests a 
prevailing attitude about chemical weapons that helps explain why treaties with relatively weak explicit 
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Because compliance with chemical weapons treaties has always depended on 
the societal “othering” of chemical weapons—the notion that chemical weapons 
are especially dangerous and immoral—applying the prohibitions in the treaty 
too often has the potential to be as detrimental to compliance as applying it too 
infrequently, because over-application dilutes the special nature of chemical 
weapons.200 Without this special nature, chemical weapons become mundane.201 
Because the legal enforcement mechanisms are weak and dependent on this long-
standing fear, making the treaty applicable to more infractions has the inverse 
effect of making it more difficult to enforce by diluting the moral outrage against 
chemical warfare.202 On the other hand, under-enforcement of the treaty could 
lead to rogue states turning to chemical weapons as a means of increasing their 
position of power within the international community or as a method of 
controlling their populace.203 By allowing acts that should fall within the 
prohibited category of the treaty to pass unaddressed, the likelihood of more 
attacks like the ones in Syria could increase. 
The Geneva Protocol and its progeny have never been, on their own, terribly 
strong or effective international law.204 Instead, it is the fear of the unique 
character of chemical weapons as particularly inhumane and “uncivilized,” 
combined with a concern about retaliation, that has fostered general international 
compliance—with a few notable exceptions—to the prohibition on chemical 
weapons.205 The vague nature of the treaties’ definitions of chemical weapons, 
combined with the lack of any cognizable enforcement mechanism, and a lack of 
historical precedent for enforcement methods, leads to the dual threat of under-
enforcement—creating an atmosphere where the events in Syria can take place—
and over-enforcement—leading to a case like Bond that threatens to dilute the 
only real strength of the treaties: the rare nature of chemical weapons use.206 The 
way to remedy these concerns is by clarifying what does and does not qualify as 




enforcement mechanisms still draw such international outrage and attention when they are violated. See 
generally id. 
200. Price, supra note 52, at 96. 
201. See Reisman supra note 86, at 470. 
202. Price, supra note 52, at 77–78. 
203. See Reisman, supra note 86, at 470. 
204. See supra Parts II & III. 
205. See supra Parts II & III. 
206. See supra Part IV. 
207. See supra Part V. 
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